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I. INTRODUCTION
When an Indian's civil rights are jeopardized on tribally owned land, he
or she is limited to state or federal court in seeking a remedy. Under federal
law, tribal courts do not have jurisdiction to protect their members from
civil rights violations by non-tribal members or state officers.' The U.S.
Supreme Court has failed to recognize the right of Indian Tribes to protect
their members through adjudication of civil rights claims. In doing so, the
Court has ignored congressional intent to expand tribal court jurisdiction.
The holdings of Nevada v. Hicks illustrate the dissonance between con-
gressional intent and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. The Court
attributes this dissonance to a lack of congressional authority, difficulties in
removing cases from tribal courts, and the current tribal court status of lim-
2ited jurisdiction. However, Congress has authorized tribes to exercise regu-
latory jurisdiction,3 retain minimal criminal jurisdiction over its members ,
exercise complete civil jurisdiction over members,5 and, under certain cir-
cumstances, exert civil jurisdiction over non-members and non-Indians.6
* J.D. expected May of 2004 University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Montana. The
author extends much gratitude to her husband Jason, and her family for their support during the law
school experience.
I. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353,368-369 (2001).
2. Id. at 367-68.
3. Id. at 367.
4. Id. at 366.
5. See generally Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
6. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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This recognition of jurisdiction illustrates congressional intent to allow
unlimited tribal jurisdiction, which would result in concurrent jurisdiction
between tribal and state courts. Thus, unlimited tribal court jurisdiction
would require the states to confer full faith and credit to tribal judgments.
States, understandably, consider this possibility a threat to their sovereignty.
Unlimited tribal court jurisdiction would change the face of current Ameri-
can jurisprudence, and challenge a long-held status quo.
This note criticizes the Court's decision in Nevada v. Hicks for maintain-
ing the status quo, and failing to acknowledge Congress' intent to expand
tribal jurisdiction and respect tribal sovereignty. Restriction of tribal court
jurisdiction reflects antiquated, imperialistic notions of jurisprudence, inap-
propriate in this century. The Court's decision further restricts tribal sover-
eignty, and is inconsistent with social and legislative trends towards ac-
knowledging the sovereignty of Tribal governments. To retain inherent
sovereignty and strengthen self-government, tribes must have jurisdiction
over matters arising on reservation land-including civil rights claims.
II. THE FACTS OF NEVADA V. HICKS
Nevada v. Hicks illustrates the power struggle among the states, tribes,
Congress, and the Judiciary. The State of Nevada wants jurisdiction over
each individual within its borders, while the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe
seeks to retain inherent sovereignty by exercising jurisdiction over each
individual within reservation boundaries. Congress has an interest in main-
taining control over the trust relationship it has with all tribes, and the Judi-
ciary has an interest in developing and maintaining case precedent that fa-
cilitates congressional goals. Nevada v. Hicks demonstrates how these in-
terests are at odds.
Floyd Hicks is a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes and re-
.7
sides on the Tribe's Reservation in western Nevada. In 1990, Hicks was
suspected of killing a protected California big horn sheep outside Reserva-
tion boundaries. A Nevada state game warden secured a search warrant and
obtained tribal permission to execute the warrant before searching Hicks'
property, located on the reservation, for California big horn sheep remains.
The game warden was accompanied by a Tribal police officer. The search
yielded no indication of illegal activity and only the remains of an unpro-
tected sheep species were found on Hicks' property.
Several months after the first search, a Tribal police officer re-alleged the
existence of California big horn sheep remains on Hicks' property. Again, a
search warrant was obtained, and the Tribe gave the wardens permission to
7. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 355-356.
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enter the Reservation and execute the search warrant. Like the first search,
the second search yielded no evidence of illegal activity.8
Hicks claimed that his property had been damaged during the second
search of his home. He filed suit in the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribal Court
against the game wardens, both individually, and in their official capacities
as law enforcement authorities for Nevada. The action also named the
Tribal court judge who authorized the search and the Tribal officers who
participated in the search.9 Hicks' suit alleged denial of equal protection,
violation of due process and unreasonable search and seizure.'0 Ultimately,
Hicks dismissed the claims against all defendants except the State of Ne-
vada and the game wardens. The Tribal court then asserted jurisdiction, and
after an appeal by the wardens, the Tribal appellate court affirmed."
In order to challenge the personal jurisdiction of the Tribal court over
non-members of the Tribe, the State of Nevada and the wardens filed suit in
federal district court without first raising an initial jurisdictional challenge
in Tribal court. The district court affirmed tribal jurisdiction over the matter
and held that Nevada and the wardens had to exhaust all tribal remedies
before pursuing an action in federal court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed tribal jurisdiction, focusing on the fact that Hicks' home was
located on tribally owned land.' 2 Nevada and the wardens then appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari 13 and wrote the opinion
discussed in this note.' 4 The Supreme Court addressed the following ques-
tions: (1) whether the Tribal court had jurisdiction over state officials exe-
cuting search warrants against tribal members for alleged violations of state
law committed off the Reservation; and (2) whether the Tribal court could
assert jurisdiction over claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'5
III. THE MAJORITY HOLDING
Justice Scalia wrote the majority holding in Nevada v. Hicks, which re-
versed and remanded to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for further pro-
ceedings. 16 In deciding the first issue, whether the Tribal court had jurisdic-
tion over the Nevada game wardens, the Supreme Court relied upon the rule
established in Montana v. U.S. ' 7 The Montana rule asserts that a tribal court
does not have jurisdiction over non-members, unless one of the following
8. Id. at 356.
9. Id. at 356.
10. Id. at 356-57.
II. Id. at 357.
12. See Nevada v. Hicks, 196 F.3d 1020 (9" Cir. 1999).
13. Nevada v. Hicks, 531 U.S. 923 (2000).
14. Id. at 357.
15. Hicks, 533 U.S at 357. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that any person who acts "under color of any
statute" to deprive a U.S. citizen of any "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law."
16. Id. at 376.
17. Id. at 358.
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exceptions apply: (1) the tribe entered into a contractual relationship or
"other arrangement" with non-members for commercial purposes; or (2) the
non-member conduct presents a danger to the economic, health or political
welfare of the tribe.' 8 The Court rejected applicability of the first exception,
holding there was no consensual commercial relationship or "other ar-
rangement" at issue, and then rejected the second exception, reasoning that
the state's interest in the execution of the search warrant did not interfere
with the health or political welfare of the tribe.' 9 Regarding the second is-
sue, tribal court jurisdiction over federal questions (i.e. 42 U.S.C. § 1983),
the Court held that the Tribe did not have proper jurisdiction because it had
not been congressionally authorized. 20 After quickly dismissing the issue,
the Court asserted that further discussion was unnecessary, and neglected to
adequately discuss tribal court subject matter jurisdiction over federal ques-
tions.
IV. DISCUSSION OF PRIOR LAW
A. The Marshall Trilogy & Implied Divestiture
The genesis of federal Indian law lies with the Marshall trilogy, which
defined the relationship between the newly formed American government
and the native Indian tribes. Justice John Marshall was the first member of
the U.S. Supreme Court to interpret this new relationship, and his opinions
have formed the foundation of Indian law as it is practiced today. The Mar-
shall trilogy consists of three cases: Johnson v. M'Intosh,21 Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia,22 and Worcester v. Georgia.23 Together, they formed the
implied divestiture doctrine, which illustrated the policy of the new Ameri-
can government toward native tribes.
The implied divestiture doctrine states that tribes surrendered all author-
ity and ownership over their native lands, and granted it to the federal gov-
ernment by the act of cession during the Treaty years of 1789-1871.24 The
creation of the implied divestiture doctrine occurred piecemeal, beginning
with a property dispute decided in Johnson v. M'Intosh in 1823.
1. The Discovery Doctrine
Inherent tribal right to tribal lands began to erode in M'Intosh, under the
auspices of the discovery doctrine. The discovery doctrine asserted the
18. Id. at 359 n.3.
19. Id. at 359 n. 3,364.
20. Id. at 369.
21. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
22. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
23. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).




colonists had the right to extinguish aboriginal title by purchase or agree-
ment, merely because they wanted to settle Indian lands. 25 Justice Mar-
shall's application of the doctrine of discovery introduced the first canon of
the implied divestiture doctrine, the loss of tribal power to bargain away
their ancient lands to American settlers.26 Marshall's decision has had dev-
astating ramifications. The decision embedded in American jurisprudence
the idea that tribes had never, neither before colonization, nor after, pos-
sessed outright ownership over land that they had occupied for millennia.
Therefore, any treaties made with the Indians were inherently suspect in the
eyes of many Americans, who believed the Indians never held title to the
lands in the first place.
2. Tribes as Domestic Dependant Nations and Establishment of the Trust
Status Relationship
The judicial policy of treating tribes as domestic dependant nations
originates in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.27 In this second case of the Mar-
shall trilogy, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether Indian tribes were
foreign nations and thus, warranted treatment as such. Here, Justice Mar-
shall acknowledged tribal rights to the land they occupied, but refused to
acknowledge outright tribal ownership. Marshall stated, "until that right
shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government ... [t]hey
may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent na-
tions. ' 28 Refusal to acknowledge tribal ownership led to the policy that In-
dian tribes are not sovereign foreign nations. The question then became
how to categorize the unique status of Indian tribes.
The Court's Cherokee Nation holding produced the second canon of the
Marshall trilogy: treating tribes as domestic dependent nations rather than
foreign nations. The holding defined the relationship between tribes and the
federal government as a trust status relationship. The trust status relation-
ship between tribes and the government is paternalistic and reflects the
view that tribes and tribal members are incompetent to run their own af-
fairs. One consequence of the trust relationship today is that some tribal
land is still held in trust by the federal government for the respective tribe,
and the proceeds from rents are also held in trust for individual tribal mem-
bers. The trust status relationship between the federal government and
tribes is antiquated, but continues today.
25. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 595.
26. Id.
27. 30 U.S. at 17.
28. Id. at 17.
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3. Manifestation Of The Trust Status Relationship: Tribes are not Protected
from Federal Action
The third case in the Marshall trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia, confirmed
federal dominion over Indian affairs. In Worcester, the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the State of Georgia had the authority to abolish the Chero-
kee government, and absorb tribal lands located within state boundaries.2 9
The Court held that federal legislation prohibiting state interference with
Indian tribes meant that the states could not impose their laws on a tribe.30
The case stands for the proposition that states have no authority over tribes
unless it is congressionally conferred. In one respect, Worcester resulted in
a positive outcome for tribes by acknowledging tribal protection from state
action. However, the ruling has not stopped states from attempting to en-
croach upon the inherent sovereignty of tribal governments. Further, al-
though Worcester acknowledged tribal protection from state action, the
holding did not assert protection from the federal government. Thus,
Worcester negatively impacted tribes, because it affirmed the federal gov-
ernment' s control over them.
B. The Marshall Trilogy & Tribal Court Jurisdiction
The canons of the Marshall trilogy have endured throughout the twenti-
eth century. Consequently, antiquated judicial policies, holding that tribes
do not have ownership rights to their traditional lands, that tribes are do-
mestic dependant nations, and that restrict tribal authority continue to shape
contemporary case law. The trilogy has influenced many areas of Indian
law, particularly tribal jurisdiction.
Tribal jurisdiction on reservation land developed into a pivotal and con-
troversial Indian law issue as tribes became more organized during the
twentieth century. As more tribes organized central governments and court
systems, jurisdictional conflicts between the tribes, the states, and the fed-
eral government became inevitable. Today, tribal courts still struggle to
retain inherent sovereignty. Federal courts have acted adversely toward
tribal authority by systematically reducing tribal court jurisdiction in a one-
step forward, two-step back manner. The deeply embedded canons of the
Marshall trilogy have strongly influenced Indian case law, and continue to
restrict the scope of tribal authority and jurisdiction. The following is a
brief overview of significant case law affecting tribal court civil and regula-
tory jurisdiction.
29. Worchester, 31 U.S. at 539-540.
30. Id. at 561.
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1. The Development of Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction: One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back
a. Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Non-Members
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed tribal court jurisdiction over a non-
member in Williams v. Lee.31 In Williams, a non-Indian trader operating a
store on the Navajo Reservation tried to collect on an account held by a
Navajo couple.32 The Court found that the Navajo Tribal court, rather than
the Arizona state court, had proper jurisdiction over a claim brought by a
non-member. The Court reasoned that to allow state court jurisdiction
would "infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. 33 The
acknowledgment of tribal court jurisdiction over a non-member doing busi-
ness on a reservation was a landmark event. The Court recognized inherent
tribal sovereignty and tribal right to self-governance. Williams was a step
forward for tribal court jurisdiction. It appeared that tribes were on a path to
complete control over the actions of individuals on reservation land.34
b. The Exhaustion Doctrine
The U.S. Supreme Court took another step forward for tribal jurisdiction
by developing the exhaustion doctrine in National Farmers Union v. Crow
Tribe of Indians.35 The issue in National Farmers Union was whether a
tribal court had jurisdiction when a Crow child was struck by a motorcycle
driven by a non-Indian, in a school parking lot on Montana State property
within the Reservation boundaries. 36 The Court asserted that non-Indians
(and non-members) who had civil claims brought against them in tribal
court must exhaust all tribal remedies before removing the suit to federal
court.3 7 The rule is known as the exhaustion doctrine, and applies to the
jurisdiction of all tribal courts. The Court outlined two exceptions to the
exhaustion doctrine in National Farmers Union. Tribal court jurisdiction
over non-Indians is improper where: (1) it is futile due to lack of opportu-
nity to challenge the court's jurisdiction; or (2) jurisdiction by the tribe is
conducted in bad faith or in a harassing manner.38 Application of an excep-
tion prompts federal jurisdiction, and permits immediate removal. 39 Be-
cause neither of the exceptions applied, the Court asserted that the case
could not be entertained in federal court until the defendant insurance com-
31. 358 U.S. at 223.
32. Id. at 218, 269.
33. Id. at 223.
34. However, the Court would subsequently interpret Williams with an emphasis on its effect on
the interests of the federal government.
35. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
36. Id. at 847.
37. Id. at 855-857.
38. Id. at 856 n. 21.
39. Id. at 857.
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pany exhausted all avenues in tribal court.4 0 Thus, the exhaustion doctrine
was a step forward for tribal jurisdiction.
c. Further Exception to the Exhaustion Doctrine
After expanding tribal jurisdiction in Williams and National Farmers Un-
ion, the Supreme Court began to backtrack in Iowa Mutual Insurance v.
LaPlante, by creating another exception to the exhaustion doctrine. 4' In
Iowa Mutual, the Court examined whether a Tribal member, injured while
working for a company on the Blackfeet Reservation, had to allow the
Blackfeet Tribal court to assume jurisdiction before removal to a federal
court.42 The Court found that the exhaustion doctrine is mandatory for civil
claims involving non-members brought in tribal court, before removal to
state court, but not mandatory before removal to federal court. Rather, the
Court asserted that removal to a federal court is discretionary as a matter of
comity, and exhaustion is not a "jurisdictional prerequisite. 43
The Court's holding in Iowa Mutual compromised the integrity of the
tribal court system. Mandatory exhaustion of tribal court remedies spurred
development of tribal court case law and policy. Without the exhaustion
doctrine, development of tribal case law will be severely stunted, causing
tribal court case law to lag behind the evolution of tribal development, both
legal and governmental. This frustrates the purpose of the tribal court sys-
tem because tribal case law will not reflect the culture and values of the
community it was designed to serve.
d. Further Restriction of Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Matters
Occurring within Reservation Boundaries
The Supreme Court further restricted tribal control over matters occur-
ring within reservation boundaries in Strate v. A-I Contractors.44 In Strate,
the Court examined whether the tribal court had jurisdiction over an acci-
dent involving two non-Indian drivers on a North Dakota state highway
running through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.45 The Court looked
to congressional intent to determine tribal civil jurisdiction, and found that
Congress authorized the state to have the right of way on the highway
where the accident occurred.4 6 The Court held that in an accident occurring
on state land running through a reservation, the tribal court had no jurisdic-
tion over the parties, regardless of tribal membership or Indian status.47
40. Id.
41. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
42. Id. at 11.
43. Id. at 19.
44. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
45. Id. at 442-443.
46. Id. at 454-455.
47. Id. at 458.
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Denying tribal court jurisdiction over accidents (or other matters) occur-
ring on state highways within reservation boundaries further limits a tribe's
ability to resolve conflicts involving tribal members, and thus undermines
tribal sovereignty. Tribal members travel daily on state highways within
reservation boundaries and deserve the protection of their government.
However, because of the policy established in Cherokee Nation,48 the tribe
is to be treated as a domestic dependant nation and the federal government
may limit tribal authority. The ability to limit tribal authority over tribally
possessed lands directly contravenes tribal inherent sovereignty and self-
government.
2. Tribal Regulatory Jurisdiction over Natural Resources
The Supreme Court has also applied the Cherokee Nation49 canon of the
Marshall trilogy to determine the regulatory authority of tribes. The current
status of tribal regulatory jurisdiction was defined in Montana v. U.S.50 In
Montana, the Supreme Court addressed the ability of the Crow Tribe to
regulate hunting and fishing on Indian fee lands located within the Reserva-
tion boundaries. 51 The Court held that tribal courts generally lack civil regu-
latory jurisdiction over non-members on reservation land regardless of
ownership, subject to the following exceptions: (1) the non-member enters
into a consensual agreement with a tribe for commercial dealings, or (2) the
conduct of a non-member on reservation land affects the economic, health
or political welfare of the tribe.52 The Montana rule provides an appropriate
context for tribes to exert regulatory jurisdiction over non-members within
reservation boundaries. However, the Supreme Court has taken back what it
has given. Overly narrow interpretations of the Montana rule exceptions, as
illustrated by Hicks, have caused courts to apply the Montana rule broadly,
and has significantly restricted tribal regulatory jurisdiction.
In summary, the Marshall trilogy has influenced U.S. Supreme Court de-
cisions regarding civil and regulatory jurisdiction to the detriment of inher-
ent tribal sovereignty and self-government. However, Congress has demon-
strated a clear intent to confer ever-increasing authority to tribal govern-
ments for regulation of natural resources and federal question cases. Con-
tradiction between the Court's application of the antiquated Marshall tril-
ogy and Congress' intent to expand tribal court jurisdiction prompts a plea
for consistency between the two branches of government.
48. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. I.
49. Id.
50. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
5I. Id. at 547.
52. Id. at 555-556.
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V. A CRITIQUE OF THE MAJORITY HOLDING
In Nevada v. Hicks, the Supreme Court analyzed precedent from Mon-
tana and Strate and held that the Fallon Pauite-Shoshone Tribal court could
not assert jurisdiction over Nevada state officials executing a search war-
rant.53 The Court also held that tribal jurisdiction does not extend to viola-
tions of federal statute because tribal courts are not courts of general juris-
diction.54 The following discussion criticizes the majority's reasoning, and
highlights counter arguments presented by Justices O'Connor and Stevens.
A. Improper Application of the Montana Rule
The Supreme Court's decision in Nevada v. Hicks affirmed the canons of
the Marshall Trilogy and further diminished inherent tribal sovereignty. The
majority began its analysis of the first issue by dismissing the need to de-
termine whether the Tribal court's jurisdiction exceeded its congressionally
conferred authority over non-members. The majority inquired "whether the
Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes-either as an exercise of their inherent sov-
ereignty, or under grant of federal authority-[could] regulate state wardens
executing a search warrant for evidence of an off-reservation crime. 55 The
Court recognized application of the rules given in Montana and Strate,
which generally disallow tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members.56
1. Faulty Reasoning Led to a Narrow Interpretation of the Montana Rule
The Court applied the Montana rule to determine whether the Tribal
court had jurisdiction over the game wardens, and mistakenly found the
Montana exceptions inapplicable. In considering the first exception to the
Montana rule-that tribal courts have proper jurisdiction over non-
members on tribal land where the non-member has entered into a consen-
sual relationship with the tribe for commercial purposes or other arrange-
ments-the majority narrowly interpreted the term "other arrangements" to
include only private relationships. Therefore, because the Nevada search
warrant and tribal court consent to enter the reservation were between two
governments, the Court found the exception inapplicable for lack of a pri-
vate relationship.
The Court relied upon a passage in Montana to support their interpreta-
tion of "other arrangements" to mean only private relationships. 57 The Mon-
tana passage states:
53. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364.
54. Id. at 369.
55. Id. at 358.
56. Id. at 357-358.
57. Id. at 359 n. 3.
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"[I]ndian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of non-members who enter consensual relation-
ships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. 58
The term "other arrangements" can hardly be interpreted to mean only
private relationships. Within the context of the sentence, "other arrange-
ments" could be read to mean other dealings of a commercial nature not
falling under the definitions of contracts or leases.
In support of this point it is important to note the reality of tribal opera-
tions. Tribes do enter into frequent consensual, commercial relationships
with non-Indians and non-members. As a governing body, however, tribes
cannot enter into private agreements because the tribe is a public entity rep-
resenting a group of people in a governmental capacity. It follows then, that
nothing a tribe embarks upon is private. Every action a tribe takes is in a
government capacity. An example of an official tribal action would be an
agreement with a private construction firm to build a tribal hospital.
Tribes also enter into contracts with states, which are commercial and of-
ficial dealings. An example of tribal/state commercial and official dealing
are the agreements frequently entered into where the tribe contracts for am-
bulance service on the reservation in exchange for payment. Most dealings
between a state and a tribe are of a commercial and official nature. Because
this is the case, it can be said that between states and tribes, commercial and
official dealings are essentially the same. Therefore, where the tribe has
established a consensual relationship by giving permission to the State of
Nevada to execute a state warrant on tribal land, that dealing between the
state and the tribe is official in nature. Because the tribe, as a governmental
entity, cannot enter into private agreements, and because the execution of
the warrant was the result of an official agreement with the state, the first
exception to the Montana rule should apply.
2. The Court Failed to Give Appropriate Weight to the Fact That Hicks'
Property was Located on Tribal Land
The Court contradicted itself when it acknowledged its holdings in Mon-
tana and Strate were limited to non-member's dealings on non-tribe owned
land within Reservation boundaries, but then disregarded the fact that
Hicks' residence is located upon tribally owned land.59 Moreover, the Court
neglected to offer an adequate explanation for downplaying the location of
58. Montana, 430 U.S. at 565.
59. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359.
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Hicks' property. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor pointed out
this deficiency. Justice O'Connor argued that Nevada v. Hicks gives the
Supreme Court an opportunity to evaluate the holdings of Montana and
Strate under a new circumstance (i.e. jurisdiction over non-members on
tribally owned land). Justice O'Connor criticized the majority view for un-
dermining the inherent tribal sovereignty that the Supreme Court has a duty
to protect. 60 To support her views, Justice O'Connor distinguished Mon-
tana's facts from those of Hicks. She recounted that in Montana, the Tribe
sought to regulate non-members fishing on Indian fee land within the reser-
vation by licensing.6' The difference was that in Montana, the fee land was
not owned by the Tribe, whereas in Hicks, the warrant was executed on
tribally owned land.
Justice O'Connor's view on the applicability of the first exception-that
an important factor for consideration is whether the land on which the war-
rant was executed was tribally owned or not-is valid. The general rule of
Montana is that "[I]ndian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations. 6 2
Because Hicks' residence was on tribally owned property,63 the question
left to the Court is whether tribal jurisdiction over state wardens executing
warrants on tribally owned land is consistent with maintaining tribal inher-
ent sovereign power. Although the Nevada wardens acted in an official
capacity when executing their search warrant, the search occurred on tribal
property.64 Therefore, the Nevada wardens were required to comply with
the laws mandated by the Tribe. The allegations against the Nevada war-
dens included tortious actions involving Hicks' property.65 To prohibit
tribal jurisdiction over the tortious actions of state officials would under-
mine the Tribe's inherent sovereignty and right to self-government by not
allowing the Tribe to oversee all activity on its Reservation land.
The majority however, held that although Hicks' residence was on tribal
land, it was not a dispositive issue. Therefore, the location of the Hicks'
residence was quickly disregarded.66 In essence, the Court states that state
officers have the right to disregard the rights Tribal members to execute a
state warrant on tribal land.
3. The Second Exception to the Montana Rule Should have been Applied
After discarding the first exception to the Montana rule, the Supreme
Court ruled that the second exception did not apply, reasoning that the in-
60. Id. at 401 (Justice O'Connor concurring).
61. Id. at 389.
62. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
63. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 355-56.
64. Id. at 356.
65. Id. at 357.
66. Id. at 360.
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herent sovereignty of the Tribe does not exclude the right of the state to
regulate its own authority and laws on the Reservation.67 The second excep-
tion allows tribal jurisdiction over non-members where the activity of the
non-members directly affects the tribe's political integrity, economic secu-
rity, health or welfare.68 The majority evaluates the second exception in
relation to the policy of retaining inherent tribal sovereignty and congres-
sional acknowledgment of jurisdiction: "Tribal assertion of regulatory au-
thority over non-members must be connected to the right of the Indians to
make their own laws and be governed by them. ' 69 Attempting to reconcile
the right of tribal sovereignty with the interest of the state to execute a
search warrant on tribal land, the majority reasoned that the inherent sover-
eignty of the tribe does not exclude the right of the state to regulate its own
authority and laws on the Reservation.
The majority failed to recognize that denial of tribal jurisdiction over
civil rights violations would adversely affect the political integrity and wel-
fare of a tribe. A member of a tribe who lives on reservation land expects
that tribal laws and officers will protect her. Here, the state asked permis-
sion to execute their search warrants, and the Tribe acquiesced. 70 However,
the state's courtesy in asking permission to execute the warrants was found
to be only that-courtesy. Justice Scalia explained that although it may be
unclear, several Supreme Court opinions illustrate that states have at least
some power to exercise regulatory authority on tribally owned land.71 Thus,
states need not seek permission to execute search warrants because the in-
herent sovereignty of the Tribe does not exclude the rights of the state to
regulate its own authority and laws on the Reservation. Consequently, tribal
members are likely to feel apathy for the political integrity of the tribe. If
tribal members perceive that their tribe's inherent rights are not respected
by the federal government, they will have little faith in the tribal court sys-
tem and will not trust tribal governance for their protection. This would
certainly have an adverse effect on the tribe's political integrity and wel-
fare. Therefore, the second exception to the Montana rule should have ap-
plied.
Had the majority applied either of the exceptions to the Montana rule, the
central issue would have been whether the Tribal court could assert juris-
diction over federal civil liberties claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Resolution of this issue would have required the Court to give deference to
Congressional acts showing intent for tribes to retain inherent sovereignty
and self-government. However, because of the majority's too hasty rejec-
67. Id.
68. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
69. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361.
70. Id. at 355-56.
71. Id. at 362-363.
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tion of the Montana rule exceptions, congressional intent was not given due
consideration.
B. Faulty Reasoning Led to the Rejection of Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over
Federal Questions
After disposition of the first issue (holding that the tribal court did not
have jurisdiction over state game wardens executing search warrants on
tribal land), the Court analyzed the possibility of tribal court federal ques-
tion jurisdiction (i.e. 42 U.S.C. § 1983).72 The majority focused on whether
tribal courts are courts of general jurisdiction or limited jurisdiction. The
Court noted that Congress authorized states to operate as courts of general
jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution, and that removal of a claim to
a different forum is given only to state courts as a result of 28 U.S.C. §
1441.73 The Court then asserted that a tribal court's jurisdiction only arises
from congressional authority. Thus, unless there is legislation to the con-
trary, tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction.74 The Court's asser-
tion reflects the trust status relationship between the federal government
and tribes as established in the Marshall trilogy.
The majority also asserts that tribal jurisdiction over removal authorized
under federal questions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be problematic
because tribal jurisdiction would not allow defendants the right to remove
the case to federal court as they could under state jurisdiction.75 Under 28
U.S.C. § 1441, parties are not specifically given the right to remove a case
from tribal court to federal court. Rather, the statute only authorizes re-
moval from state to federal court where the federal court has original juris-
diction.76 Also, the current state of Indian law does not allow removal from
tribal court until all tribal court remedies are exhausted.77 In order to decide
whether tribal courts could assert jurisdiction over federal questions, the
Court would first have to determine whether removal from tribal court to
federal court was anticipated under the federal removal statute. But rather
than tackle this analysis, the majority avoided resolving the removal issue,
stating "[slurely the simpler way to avoid the removal problem is to con-
clude (as other indications suggest anyway) that tribal courts cannot enter-
tain § 1983 suits. 78
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens joined by Justice Breyer, endorsed
tribal subject matter jurisdiction over federal civil liberties claims. Justice
72. Id. at 366.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 allows removal of an action from state to federal court where the federal court
would have original jurisdiction over the matter at bar.
74. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 367.
75. Id. at 368.
76. 42 U.S.C. §1441 (2001).
77. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856-57.
78. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 369.
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Stevens saw no reason to deny tribal courts jurisdiction over § 1983 claims
so long as they have jurisdiction over the parties.79 The concurring opinion
highlights the fact that the majority avoided an important issue of Indian
law that was ripe for resolution. Moreover, the majority's decision on the
first issue (whether tribal courts have jurisdiction over non-Indians on tribal
land) pre-empts discussion of the second (whether tribal courts have subject
matter jurisdiction over civil liberties claims).
The Court's premature decision on tribal court subject matter jurisdiction
over civil liberties claims could have a devastating effect on tribal court
systems. The issue of tribal court jurisdiction over civil liberties claims will
inevitably resurface, and the Court will have to clearly define the scope of
tribal court jurisdiction recognized by federal law. When the time comes,
the Court surely will look to the precedent established in Hicks. The Court's
hasty decision in Hicks will serve to justify further erosion of tribal jurisdic-
tion.
1. The Majority Holding Contradicts Congressional Authorization of
Tribal Regulatory Jurisdiction
Congress has shown clear intent to expand recognition of tribal court ju-
risdiction. Recent legislation provides tribal regulatory and subject matter
jurisdiction over matters that were traditionally retained by the state or fed-
eral judicial system. Congressional recognition of tribal court jurisdiction
over civil liberties claims is not the impossibility the Supreme Court be-
lieves it to be. Regulatory jurisdiction authorized by Congress during the
last thirty years shows Congress intends to preserve inherent tribal sover-
eignty and tribal right to self-governance. For example, statutes like the
Clean Water Act (CWA) 80 and the Clean Air Act (CAA),8 1 which confer
Tribes with State (TAS) status. The CAA specifies that TAS status may
only be authorized if a tribe meets the following criteria: (1) the tribe has a
central governing body; (2) regulation of air quality is only within the
tribe's jurisdiction (within reservation boundaries and the area surrounding
reservation boundaries over which the tribe may have jurisdiction); and (3)
the tribe has the capacity to carry out the functions consistent with applica-
ble regulations. TAS status gives tribes the authority to regulate water and
air quality on their reservations, possibly above and beyond the minimum
federal standards, without interference by states. Conferring TAS status
demonstrates Congress' intent to protect and promote tribal sovereignty.
U.S. district and appellate courts have upheld tribal regulatory authority
over non-members. For example, in City of Albuquerque v. Browner,8 3 Al-
79. Id. at 403.
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (2001).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2001).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (2001).
83. Ci' of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10"t Cir. 1996).
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buquerque sought to prevent the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
from authorizing the Isleta Pueblo Tribe to regulate waste water originating
from the city and flowing through the Isleta Reservation. Tribal water qual-
ity standards on the Reservation exceed both New Mexico and federal stan-
dards. 84 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that higher standards im-
posed by the Tribe were consistent with the congressional policy of inher-
ent tribal sovereignty and right to self-government. 85 The holding con-
firmed the prohibition of state interference with the Tribe's regulation of
water quality on the reservation.
In Montana v. EPA,86 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed
tribal court regulatory jurisdiction over non-members by rejecting another
challenge to TAS. The court focused on whether the Tribe fulfilled the third
requirement for TAS status, and deferred to Congressional intent to protect
tribes' inherent sovereignty, holding "[t]he third requirement, with which
we are principally concerned, is intended to reflect the scope of a tribe's
'inherent power,' a concept developed by the Supreme Court to define
when tribes may engage in nonconsensual regulation of activities of non-
members. 87 The court applied the Montana rule and its exceptions to help
interpret the CWA and TAS provisions, and determine whether regulation
over non-member water polluters was appropriate. The court noted that the
second exception to the Montana rule would apply, because failing to au-
thorize tribes to regulate non-member polluters within their reservations
would pose a serious threat to tribes' economic health, political health, and
general welfare. 88 Applicability of the first Montana rule exception bol-
stered the court's decision that the third TAS requirement was met; it also
bolstered the court's finding that Congress intended to authorize regulatory
jurisdiction over non-members to protect tribes' inherent sovereignty. The
test described in Montana v. EPA exemplifies a balance between congres-
sional authority and judicial interpretation, and can be used to determine
both regulatory and subject matter jurisdiction of tribal courts.
Other appellate courts have also denied state challenges to CAA provi-
sions granting TAS status and the ensuing regulatory authority of the tribe
to issue permits. For example, in Arizona Public Service Company v.
EPA,89 the petitioner's challenged the 1990 amendments to the CAA claim-
ing that the EPA had granted tribes too much authority to regulate air qual-
ity on reservations, including non-Indian fee land. 90 The appellate court
analyzed congressional intent behind the amendments, and found that Con-
gress intended to authorize tribal regulation of all air quality within the
84. Id. at 419.
85. Id. at 423.
86. Mont. v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9 Cir. 1998).
87. Id. at 1139.
88. Mont. v. EPA, at 1141.
89. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
90. Id. at 1284.
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boundaries of a reservation. 9' In particular, the court ruled that tribal regula-
tory authority extended to non-Indian fee lands.92
State of Michigan v. EPA illustrates a second unsuccessful challenge to
tribal regulatory authority (as provided by the CAA). 93 In Michigan, the
court analyzed tribal regulatory authority over land where tribal jurisdiction
is in question due to unclear Indian country status.94 In deciding whether the
EPA, and consequently a tribe, has jurisdictional authority, the court con-
cluded, "[w]here a valid state program exists, EPA may implement a fed-
eral program only for Indian country itself, not for lands the status of which
EPA deems 'in question'. 95 In summary, the CWA and CAA demonstrate
Congress' intent to allow tribal regulatory authority where jurisdiction can
be exercised.
2. The Indian Child Welfare Act and Indian Civil Rights Act Exemplify
Congress' Express Authorization of Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Fed-
eral Questions
Congress has authorized tribal court jurisdiction in certain circumstances
such as the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA),96 and the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).97 These statutes are joined by the growing
body of regulatory jurisdiction that illustrates congressional intent to pro-
mote inherent sovereignty and self-government of tribes through decision-
making processes, which use a non-Indian court system while accounting
for the values and traditions of a particular tribe.
The ICWA98 addresses adoption or removal of an Indian child from her
home by a state protective agency. The statute assumes tribal jurisdiction
over the child when the child is domiciled within the reservation bounda-
ries. Where a child has not been domiciled on her reservation, the tribe will
have jurisdiction absent a determination of good cause. 99 The assumption of
tribal court jurisdiction over. a member child gives the tribe a chance to de-
termine what is in the best interests of the child and establishes a hierarchy
of preferred individuals with whom to place the child. Arguably, the tribal
court, staffed with tribal members, possess cultural experiences similar to
the child's, are best suited to determine the child's best interests.
Another example of congressional authorization of tribal court jurisdic-
tion over federal questions is found in ICRA.1°° The Act was passed in or-
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1288.
93. Mich. v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
94. Id. at 1077-78.
95. Id. at 1088-89.
96. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2002).
97. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (2002).
98. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
99. Id. at § 1911 (a)(b).
100. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341.
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der to give Native Americans protection against the actions of their tribes in
the same way the Bill of Rights affords civil rights protection to citizens
from their state. 01 Like the ICWA, the ICRA authorizes tribal courts to
protect the rights of members in a manner consistent with their culture and
tradition.
One positive court interpretation has held that an express jurisdictional
prohibition is required within the applicable federal statute before tribal
court jurisdiction can be limited.10 2 In El Paso Natural Gas, the City of El
Paso sought an exception to the exhaustion doctrine based upon an "express
jurisdictional prohibition."' °3 The Ninth Circuit held that without an express
prohibition against tribal court jurisdiction in a pertinent federal statute,
tribal jurisdiction should be assumed automatically. °4 The Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of tribal jurisdiction over federal questions is an important
step in retaining tribal sovereignty and self-government and should be fol-
lowed by the Supreme Court.
C. Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Federal Civil Liberties Claims would not
Cause Removal and Recognition Problems
Had the Supreme Court ruled that Tribal court jurisdiction over the Ne-
vada state game wardens was proper in Hicks, the removal and recognition
problems predicted by the majority would not be fatal if analyzed under
common law.
1. Post-Exhaustion Removal to Federal Court Would Eliminate the Threat
of Inappropriate Tribal Adjudication
Justice Scalia, on behalf of the majority, mistakenly predicts that tribal
court jurisdiction over civil liberties claims would be fatally problematic:
"[t]ribal-court jurisdiction would create serious anomalies.. .because the
general federal-question removal statute refers only to removal from state
court." 10 5 Here, the Court makes a sweeping statement while ignoring well-
established principles of federal Indian common law. The majority mistak-
enly assumes that the federal government's relation to tribes is the same as
their relation to the states. This assumption is incorrect. Principles of fed-
eral Indian law have developed with a constant emphasis on the inherent
differences between the two types of sovereigns.
For cases brought with concurrent tribal and federal court jurisdiction,
exhaustion of tribal remedies is not a rigid mandate. In National Farmers
Union v. Crow Tribe of Indians, the Court held that where an action could
101. Id. § 1302.
102. El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 136 F.3d 610 (9"' Cir. 1998).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 617.
105. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 368.
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be brought to either federal or tribal court under a federal statute, the peti-
tioners must exhaust all tribal remedies before removing the case to federal
court.' 06 Subsequently, in Iowa Mutual, the Court limited the exhaustion
doctrine by asserting that exhaustion of tribal remedies is merely "pruden-
tial." 0 7 This means that exhaustion of tribal court remedies is preferred, but
that in reality, it is not necessary before removing a suit to the federal court.
Thus, a finding of concurrent jurisdiction over federal civil liberties claims
is not as problematic as the majority in Hicks fears. A case can always be
removed to federal court subsequent to exhaustion, and under Iowa Mutual,
removal to federal court prior to exhaustion is appropriate in certain cir-
cumstances.
Removing civil liberty claims after exhausting tribal remedies would
spur development of tribal law in a risk free manner, because federal courts
can always review tribal court decisions. One author explains that a federal
court hearing a matter regarding exhaustion on appeal will review federal
questions de novo. 0 8 This translates into a danger free situation for the fed-
eral government while allowing tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction, protect
the interests of their members, and establish case law. Although a de novo
review of every federal question decided by a tribal court might result in a
two-step forward, one-step back situation, it would stimulate further devel-
opment of tribal case law.
The recent trend toward state court jurisdiction over federal civil liberties
claims bolsters an argument for tribal court jurisdiction over civil liberties
claims. The reasoning for the recent state court § 1983 activity has been
eloquently summarized:
[Tihe state judiciary, which has played a subordinate role
in protecting civil rights and civil liberties during the past
half century, has recently become a significant force in pro-
tecting those individual rights. Largely in response to Su-
preme Court decisions narrowing federal safeguards, many
state courts have begun to develop independent interpreta-
tions of state law, and have begun to play a new and impor-
tant role in protecting individual rights.' °9
Tribal courts are equipped to play a similar role for their members as states
do for their citizens. Congress has authorized regulatory jurisdiction with
the belief that tribal courts are best suited to hear matters regarding such
issues as clean water and air within reservation boundaries. Also, limited
106. 471 U.S. at 856-57.
107. See generally Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
108. Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court Decisions, 46
U. Kan. L. Rev. 241,277 (1998).
109. Steven H. Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A Procedural Review, 38 U.
Miami L. Rev. 381, 398 (1984).
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regulatory jurisdiction has been conferred for situations where Indian chil-
dren and individuals need protection under the ICWA and the ICRA. These
acts are clear manifestations of congressional intent to protect tribal inher-
ent sovereignty and self-government by conferring increasing authority.
Justice Stevens' opinion that tribal courts are competent to hear federal
questions arising under § 1983 promotes growth of tribal court systems and
empowers tribal courts to protect their members in a manner consistent with
Indian tradition and culture. In the case at hand, authorizing tribal court
jurisdiction over Floyd Hicks' civil liberties claim would give the Fallon-
Paiute Shoshone the chance to protect its members from the actions of state
officials.
2. The Doctrine of Comity Does not Mandate Enforcement and Recognition
by State and Federal Courts
The doctrine of comity would also provide a safe way to allow tribal
court systems to exercise jurisdiction over federal civil liberties claims.
Under the current scheme, most state and federal courts afford comity to
tribal court judgments, rather than full faith and credit." 10 Currently, only
two states give full faith and credit to tribal court judgments. 11 Recent case
law defines "comity" as a discretionary courtesy in the context of federal
Indian law. In Iowa Mutual, the Court reiterated that exhaustion of tribal
remedies is required only as a matter of comity, and is not a jurisdictional
requirement." 12 Thus, as applied in the context of Indian law, the doctrine of
comity prevents a rigid mandate that state and federal courts adopt tribal
court judgments.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has defined when a state or federal
court must give full faith and credit to tribal court judgments and when
mere comity is permissible. In Wilson v. Marchington,' '3 the petitioner
sought recognition of her Tribal court judgment in Montana district court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1738'14 (the Full Faith and Credit statute). The court as-
serted that full faith and credit must be given to Tribal court judgments
when a pertinent federal statute evidences congressional intent that full faith
110. Comity is defined as "courtesy among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different
jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts." Black's
Law Dictionary 261 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7 ed., West 1999). Full Faith and Credit is defined as "a
state's enforcement of another jurisdiction's laws or judicial decisions." Black's Law Dictionar. 681
(Bryan A. Garner ed., 71h ed., West 1999).
I I I. These states are Idaho and New Mexico. Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional and Enforcement
of Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. Rev. 311, 345 (2000).
112. 480 U.S. at 16.
113. 127 F.3d 805, 806 (9" Cir. 1997).
114 ... [S]uch Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have
the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are
taken. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2001).
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and credit be conferred." 5 The court then specified situations where a fed-
eral court may recognize a tribal court judgment, although not legislatively
mandated. In short, conity is permissible if both the following requirements
are met: (1) the tribal court had both personal and subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and (2) the defendant was afforded due process of law." 16
Had the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Tribal jurisdiction over Hicks'
claim, exhaustion of tribal remedies would have been required before re-
moval to state or federal court because none of the exceptions to the doc-
trine of exhaustion were invoked." 7 Under National Farmers Union, ex-
haustion is not required in either of the following situations: where (1) it is
futile to challenge the court's jurisdiction due to lack of opportunity; or (2)
the tribal court exercises jurisdiction in bad faith or in a harassing man-
ner." 8 Neither exception applies to the facts in Hicks. First, nothing in the
record shows that the Tribal court failed to offer substantial opportunity to
challenge the Tribal court's jurisdiction. Nevada did not bother to challenge
the Tribal court's jurisdiction at the tribal court level; instead, it sought im-
mediate removal. Second, tribal court jurisdiction was not exercised in bad
faith or in a harassing manner. Hicks is a member of the Tribe, and his
Tribe has an interest in protecting his rights against state activity within
reservation boundaries. Further, the record is devoid of any evidence that
the tribe asserted jurisdiction in a harassing manner. Thus, had the Court
affirmed tribal jurisdiction, the Nevada wardens would have been required
to exhaust tribal remedies.
Although exhaustion would have been required had the Court affirmed
tribal court jurisdiction in Hicks, the doctrine of comity (as applied in the
context of Indian law) would permit a state or federal court to recognize
and enforce the tribal court's decision. As discussed above, a state or fed-
eral court may extend comity to a tribal court when the following criteria
are met: (1) the tribal court had both personal and subject matter jurisdic-
tion; and (2) the defendant was afforded due process of law. Because the
hypothetical supposes a positive jurisdictional result from the Supreme
Court, the first requirement would be satisfied. For the second requirement
to fail, the Nevada game wardens would have to assert they were denied
due process at some point during the litigation. However, the Nevada war-
dens made no assertion of a denial of due process at any point during the
litigation. Thus, if the Tribal court had decided in Hicks' favor, the doctrine
of comity would have permitted a state or federal court to recognize and
enforce the decision.
The doctrines of exhaustion and comity provide a safety mechanism for
allowing tribal court jurisdiction over civil liberties claims. The doctrine of
115. 127 F.3d at 808.
116. Id. at 812.
117. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 357.
118. Natl. Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856 n. 2 1.
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exhaustion empowers tribal courts to fully adjudicate cases, while the doc-
trine of comity (as applied in the context of Indian law) provides a check on
tribal court jurisdiction by giving state and federal courts discretion as to
whether to extend comity. While the opportunity for tribal courts is im-
mense, risks of removal and recognition problems in the federal courts are
minimal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Nevada v. Hicks is inconsistent
with the intent of Congress to preserve tribal sovereignty and self-
government. During the last half-century, the Court has increasingly limited
tribal court jurisdiction over tribal members, non-members, Indians, and
non-Indians within reservation boundaries. During the same period, Con-
gress has expanded tribal court jurisdiction. Congress' amendments to the
CAA and CWA expressly expand tribal court regulatory jurisdiction, while
the ICWA and ICRA authorize tribal court jurisdiction under federal stat-
ute. These acts evidence Congress' intent to expand tribal court jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, despite Congress' intent and recent trends toward expanding
tribal court jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme Court continues to rely upon the
antiquated canons of the Marshall trilogy to limit tribal court jurisdiction.
Consistency between Congress and the Supreme Court is necessary for
the integrity of the tribal court system. Tribal courts currently exist in a
state of jurisdictional limbo, and development of tribal law is stunted as a
result. Tribal courts are competent, and are in an early but pivotal stage of
developing statutory and case law reflecting their unique traditions and cul-
tures. Authorizing jurisdiction in Hicks would have facilitated a test run at
tribal court jurisdiction over a federal statute (i.e. 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In
addition, this would have given tribal court systems the opportunity to pro-
tect their members in the same manner that state courts protect state citi-
zens. Ultimately, tribal members like Floyd Hicks deserve the same protec-
tion in tribal courts that non-Indians are afforded in state and federal courts.
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